Israel’s attacks on Lebanon continue to cause catastrophic humanitarian consequences and widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure. As of 24 May, the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health reported that Israeli attacks since March 2, have killed 3,151 people and wounded 9,571 others, and is expected to rise significantly.1 UNICEF has further stated that “children in Lebanon continue to be at the sharp end of ongoing violence, displacement and exposure to traumatic events,” noting that at least 200 children have been killed, including 59 children killed or wounded in the past week.2
Israel has launched massive airstrikes and ground operations in Lebanon, particularly within the yellow line that marks occupation of southern Lebanon by Israeli troops.3 The yellow line, established following the ceasefire on 17 April, demarcates a self-declared Israeli zone in South Lebanon in which Israeli army illegally occupy approximately 6% of Lebanese territory4 (608 square kilometers and 68 villages along the border) and turned dozens of villages into militarized “buffer zones”, with no timeable for the withdrawal of Israeli troops. On the first day of the ceasefire, Israel reissued forced displacement orders in nine towns south of the Litani,5 an area already cut off from the rest of the country due to the destruction of all bridges by Israel.6 Israeli army further warned Lebanese residents not to return to areas south of the Litani and stated that anyone approaching the line will be seen as a “threat”, fueling fears of prolonged displacement and occupation.7 Israel subsequently carried out and intensified strikes in many of these villages, systematically destructing civilian homes, rendering them uninhabitable and killing more than 800 people since the ceasefire.8 According to Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research, Israeli airstrikes destroyed or damaged more than 10,000 homes across the country since the ceasefire.9 Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has recently stated that the town of Bint Jbeil in southern Lebanon – one city that Israeli forces have laid siege to – “has become a version of Gaza”.10 Israel made a similar line in Gaza in October 2025 where Israeli troops routinely fire on anyone approaching the line even if they are trying to get to their homes, and the line is being repeatedly extended deeper into Palestinian territory.11
New Israeli displacement orders have gradually expanded to towns north of the Litani as well as parts of the Bekaa, beyond its current zone of occupation, in continued violation of the ceasefire.12 ACHR continues to monitor.
Israel’s indiscriminate attacks in southern Lebanon
In previous military operations in Gaza and Lebanon, Israel has demonstrated a pattern of attacks targeting civilians, including refugees, and civilian infrastructure such as homes, hospitals and medical centres, which amount to indiscriminate attacks. Under international law, indiscriminate attacks are those that are not directed at a specific military objective or that target civilians and civilian objects without distinction and are therefore prohibited.13 For instance, on 13 May, a series of Israeli drone strikes targeted multiple vehicles in the localities of Barja, Jiyeh and Saadiyat, including along a major Lebanese highway, killing at least 12 people, among them a woman and her two children.14 On 16 May, an Israeli strike on a civil defence centre in southern Lebanon killed at least six people, including three paramedics, and wounded 22 others.15 As such, Israeli attacks have directly impacted civilian areas and also affected the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), with at least six peacekeepers killed and many others injured since 2 March.16 Due to the scale of violence affecting UNIFIL personnel and convoys, China’s UN Ambassador has called for a review of the UN Security Council’s decision to end the peacekeeping mission’s mandate in Lebanon.17
Israel has also repeatedly used so-called “double tap” or “triple tap” strikes, involving follow-up attacks targeting the same location shortly after an initial strike, often when rescuers and medical teams arrive to provide assistance. This tactic has proven particularly deadly in Gaza and Lebanon. Recently, two Lebanese civil defence workers were killed in Nabatieh while carrying out a rescue mission following an earlier strike. In another incident, two rescue workers were injured in Toul while responding to a previous attack on the same location. Medical infrastructure has also been severely affected by these attacks. The only functioning hospital in southern Lebanon, Tbnin Hospital, has been struck multiple times by Israeli forces, including in a recent triple attack that killed medical workers.18 Doctors operating in Lebanon have further reported finding the same tungsten cube fragments, causing grave internal injuries, previously documented in Gaza injuries in civilians wounded in Lebanon.19
Further, under international humanitarian law, the wanton destruction of civilian property in the absence of military necessity constitutes a war crime.20 In southern Lebanon, Israel has engaged in widespread destruction, particularly in areas from which civilians have been barred and where those attempting to return, including residents, journalists and rescue workers have been attacked or killed. Israeli forces have carried out demolition campaigns using explosions and bulldozers, leaving entire villages devastated21 with more than 27,000 homes, 182 public buildings, 35 schools, and nine historical landmarks have been completely destroyed, by Israeli strikes while nearly 100,000 homes have been damaged or affected since March 2.22 The repeated and systematic nature of these demolitions and forced displacement orders also prevent civilians from returning or assessing whether their home is still there.
Situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
Israeli strikes has directly affected Syrian refugees, particularly in southern areas along the Litani River where many refugee communities are concentrated and where Israeli troops continue to occupy villages and conduct military operations.
ACHR field team has documented several cases of Syrian refugees killed and injured in recent weeks. On 2 May, an Israeli drone strike targeted a vehicle carrying Syrian workers in the town of Zawtar al-Sharqiya, killing three refugees and injuring five others. On 4 May, local reports indicated that an entire Syrian family was killed in an airstrike targeting a vehicle as they attempted to flee the area of Zawtar al-Gharbiya. Ambulance teams were reportedly unable to reach the site for several days due to the security situation. On 9 May, the Lebanese Ministry of Health announced the killing of a Syrian refugee and the serious injury of his daughter following a drone strike in Nabatieh. A few days later, on 12 May, another Syrian refugee was killed and his wife injured during an airstrike on the town of Tayr Debba.
These attacks are also taking place in a broader context of increasing restrictions and security measures imposed on Syrian refugees by Lebanese authorities. Between 10 and 17 April, Syrian refugees face persistent challenges regarding key legal documentation, including expired residency, irregular status and missing documentation. Across Bekaa and the North, refugees without valid residency are avoiding movement due to checkpoints and security checks which limit their ability to access services or complete legal procedures. In Akkar, municipalities are requiring new arrivals to register and present identification papers, while in other areas, Syrians reported fear of arrest or deportation at checkpoints. As a result, movements are often restricted to emergencies which directly impact access to services. Barriers also affected civil documentation registration in the North, where procedural requirements are stricter. Cases were reported in which birth certificates could not be registered without the presence of one parent.
Similarly, checkpoint controls have intensified, particularly in the Bekaa and Baalbek-Hermel regions, including at the Harbata and Al-Mahatta checkpoints in Hermel, as well as the Deir Ammar and Chadra checkpoints in northern Lebanon. ACHR field teams documented cases of arrests and deportations of Syrian refugees by Lebanese General Security linked to expired residency permits or irregular entry into Lebanon. After being deported, several returnees also reported being subjected to ill-treatment at border crossings by Lebanese General Security, including beatings, in addition to fines and cases of temporary or permanent entry bans.
At the same time, Lebanese General Security announced the extension of the regularization of the status period for foreign workers in irregular situations until 30 June 2026, while warning that broader inspection campaigns and enforcement measures would follow after the deadline.23 However, between 13 and 17 May, Syrian workers reported already receiving summons from Lebanese General Security centres, and some workers were detained for several hours, had identification and residency documents confiscated, and were referred for investigation at General Security headquarters in Beirut. These developments have generated widespread fear and anxiety among Syrian refugees in Lebanon, particularly as the security and military escalation has disrupted livelihoods and income opportunities for Lebanese citizens, refugees, and migrant workers alike, with employers abandoning workers in sectors such as construction, agriculture, and daily labour.
Displacement, cross-border movements and returns
Despite the ceasefire, displacement continues, with Lebanese families, migrants, and refugees still being forced to flee. Many families from southern Lebanon attempting to return after weeks or months of displacement have found their homes destroyed or damaged and that they face insecurity, lack of electricity and water and limited access to essential services such as healthcare facilities and schools. As of 15 May 2026, over one million people remain internally displaced in Lebanon. While the majority reside outside formal sites, secondary displacement back into shelters has resulted in a 13% increase in shelter occupancy since the ceasefire.24 As of 14 May, the Government of Lebanon reports that more than 130,000 people are in 634 collective shelters.25
Similarly, cross-border movements from Lebanon to Syria have also increased due to Israeli attacks. Israeli attacks continue to drive cross-border movements from Lebanon into Syria. According to the UNHCR, more than 277,000 people crossed into Syria through three official border points between 2 March and 12 April, including the vast majority of around 234,000 Syrians (among them refugees who had previously sought safety in Lebanon), as well as approximately 43,000 Lebanese fleeing intense Israeli bombardments.26 Of note, these figures do not account for many displaced crossing through unofficial routes.
Importantly, UNHCR stated that it will continue to support refugees willing to return. On 1 April 2026, UNHCR launched a return plan due to force majeure and, as of 17 April had assisted 4,500 individuals through counselling services and return cash assistance of 100 dollar per returning individual.27 However, UNHCR’s latest survey indicates that 68% of Syrian refugees who returned between June and December 2025 had previously stated in June 2025 that they did not intend to return within the following 12 months. This suggests that return movements are being driven by rapidly deteriorating security and humanitarian conditions, with many people returning to circumstances that fall short of standards of safety, dignity, and voluntariness.